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Abstract
We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games.
Players continually face new strategic situations and must form beliefs by extrapola-
tion from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning in
terms of iterated dominance in a related incomplete information game with subjective
priors. The use of extrapolations in learning may generate contagion of actions across
games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close to the current
ones. Contagion may lead to unique long-run outcomes where multiplicity would occur
if players learned through repeatedly playing the same game. The process of conta-
gion through learning is formally related to contagion in global games, although the
outcomes generally differ.
Keywords: Similarity, learning, contagion, case-based reasoning, global games,
coordination, subjective priors.
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1 Introduction
In standard models of learning, players repeatedly interact in the same game, and use
their experience from the history of play to decide which action to choose in each period.
In many cases of interest, decision-makers are faced with many different strategic
situations, and the number of possibilities is so vast that a particular situation is
virtually never experienced twice. The history of play may nonetheless be informative
when choosing an action, as previous situations, though different, may be similar to
the current one. Thus, a tacit assumption of standard learning models is that players
extrapolate their experience from previous interactions similar to the current one.
The central message of this paper is that such extrapolation has important effects:
similarity-based learning can lead to contagion of behavior across very different strate-
gic situations. Two situations that are not directly similar may be connected by a
chain of intermediate situations, along which each is similar to the neighboring ones.
One effect of this contagion is to select a unique long-run action in situations that
would allow for multiple steady states if analyzed in isolation. For this to occur, the
extrapolations at each step of the similarity-based learning process need not be large;
in fact, the contagion effect remains even in the limit as extrapolation is based only on
increasingly similar situations.
We focus here on the application of similarity-based learning to coordination games.
Consider, as an example, the class of 2× 2 games Γ(θ) in Table 1 parameterized by a
state θ. The action Invest is strategically risky, as its payoff depends on the action of
the opponent. The safe action, Not Invest, gives a constant payoff of 0. For extreme
values of θ, the game Γ(θ) has a unique equilibrium as investing is dominant for θ > 1,
and not investing is dominant for θ < 0. When θ lies in the interval (0, 1), the game
has two strict pure strategy equilibria.
The contagion effect can be sketched without fully specifying the learning process,
which we postpone to Section 3. Two myopic players interact in many rounds in
a game Γ(θt), with θt selected at random in each round. Roughly, we assume that
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Invest Not Invest
Invest θ, θ θ − 1, 0
Not Invest 0, θ − 1 0, 0
Table 1: Payoffs in the Example of Section 2.
players estimate payoffs for the game Γ(θ) on the basis of past experience with states
similar to θ, and that two games Γ(θ) and Γ(θ′) are viewed by players as similar if the
difference |θ − θ′| is small.
Since investing is dominant for all sufficiently high states, there is some θ above
which players eventually learn to invest. Now consider a state just below θ, say θ − ε.
At θ − ε, investing may not be dominant, but players view some games with values
of θ above θ as similar. Since the opponent has learned to invest in these games,
strategic complementarities in payoffs increase the gain from investing. When ε is
small, this increase outweighs the potential loss from investing in games below θ, where
the opponent may not invest. Thus players learn to invest in games with states below,
but close to θ, giving a new threshold θ′ above which both players invest.
Repeating the argument with θ replaced by θ′, investment continues to spread to
games with smaller states, even though these are not directly similar to games in the
dominance region. The process continues until a threshold state θ∗ is reached at which
the gain from investment by the opponent above θ∗ is exactly balanced by the loss
from non-investment by the opponent below θ∗. Not investing spreads contagiously
beginning from low states by a symmetric process. These processes meet at the same
threshold, giving rise to a unique long-run outcome, provided that similarity drops off
quickly in distance.1
Contagion effects have previously been studied in local interaction and incomplete
information games. In local interaction models, actions may spread contagiously across
members of a population because each has an incentive to coordinate with her neigh-
bors in a social network (e.g. Morris (2000)). In incomplete information games with
strategic complementarities (global games), actions may spread contagiously across
1In other words, players place much more weight on states very close to the present one when forming
their payoff estimates.
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types because private information gives rise to uncertainty about the actions of other
players (Carlsson and van Damme 1993). Unlike these models, contagion through
learning depends neither on any network structure nor on high orders of reasoning
about the beliefs of other players. The contagion is driven solely by a natural solution
to the problem of learning the payoffs to one’s actions when the strategic situation
is continually changing. This problem is familiar from econometrics, where one often
wishes to estimate a function of a continuous variable using only a finite data set. The
similarity-based payoff estimates used by players in our model have a direct parallel
in the use of kernel estimators by econometricians. Moreover, the use of such esti-
mates for choosing actions is consistent with the case-based decision theory of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (2001), who propose similarity-weighted payoff averaging as a general
theory of decisions under uncertainty.
The main tool for understanding the result of contagion through learning is a formal
parallel to equilibrium play in a modified version of the game. This modified game
differs from the original game only in the priors: players eventually behave as if they
incorrectly believe their own signal to be noisy, while correctly believing that other
players perfectly observe the true state. More precisely, players learn not to play
strategies that would be serially dominated in the modified version of the game (see
Theorem 4.1).
The relationship between the long-run outcomes of similarity-based learning and
serially undominated strategies in the modified game is quite robust. The result holds
for a broad class of games and a large class of learning processes which vary in the
knowledge players have of the environment. In addition, very little structure is imposed
on the similarity functions used by the players in the learning process. Roughly speak-
ing, the modified game result holds as long as payoffs and similarity are sufficiently
continuous in the state.
The modified game result enables us to identify the long-run outcomes of learn-
ing by solving the modified game through an extension of the techniques of Carlsson
and van Damme (1993), further developed by Morris and Shin (2003). The original
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game has a continuum of equilibria, but contagion leads to a unique learning outcome
when similarity is concentrated on nearby states. This outcome involves symmetric,
monotone strategies, but depends on the shape of the similarity function. The out-
comes of contagion through learning generally differ from those of contagion through
incomplete information in global games. Since the process of contagion through learn-
ing is exactly parallel to the process of contagion through incomplete information in
the modified game, the difference between the global games and learning outcomes can
be understood as a product of the heterogeneity of the priors in the modified game.
2 Example
Before introducing the general model in Section 3, we elaborate on the example from
the Introduction to illustrate in more detail the process of contagion through learning.
The underlying family of coordination problems consists of the 2-player games in Table
1. We denote by U(ai, a−i, θ) the payoff to choosing action ai in state θ when the
opponent chooses action a−i. To simplify notation, we will refer to investing as Action
1 and not investing as Action 0.
The game is played repeatedly in periods t ∈ N, with the state θt drawn indepen-
dently across periods according to a uniform distribution on an interval [−b, 1 + b],
where b > 0. Each realization θt is perfectly observed by both players, who play a
myopic best response to their beliefs in each period. Beliefs are based on players’ pre-
vious experience, but since θ is drawn from a continuous distribution, players (almost
surely) have no past experience with the current game Γ(θt), and must extrapolate
from their experience playing different games. In each period, players estimate their
payoffs as a weighted average of historical payoffs in which the weights are determined
by the similarity between the current and past states. Strategic considerations play
no role in these estimates: players treat the past actions of their opponents as given.
Thus following any history ht =
{
θs, a
1
s, a
2
s
}
s<t
, the estimated payoff to Player i from
5
(a) Example similarity function g(·).
(b) Example payoff estimates. Dots rep-
resent observed past payoffs.
Figure 1: Example similarity function with corresponding payoff estimates according to
Equation (1).
choosing Action ai given the state θt is
r(θt;ht) =
∑
s<t g(θs − θt)U(ai, a−is , θs)∑
s<t g(θs − θt)
, (1)
where g(·) ≥ 0 is the similarity function determining the relative weight assigned to
past cases. Each Player chooses the action giving the highest estimated payoff. Beliefs
may be chosen arbitrarily if the history contains no state similar to θt, that is, if∑
s<t g(θs − θt) = 0.
For this example, suppose that g(·) is the piecewise-linear function illustrated in
Figure 1(a). Figure 1(b) illustrates the estimated payoffs as a function of θ for a
particular history of observed payoffs using this similarity function.
The learning process is stochastic, but suppose that the empirical distribution of
realized cases may be approximated by the true distribution over θ (this idea is for-
malized in Section 3 below). If the opponent plays according to a fixed strategy s−i(·),
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Player i’s expected estimated return to investing in state θ ∈ [−b+ τ, 1+ b− τ ] is given
by ∫
Θ
U
(
1, s−i(θ′), θ′
)
g(θ′ − θ)dθ′. (2)
The expression (2) is formally equivalent to the conditional expectation E
[
U
(
1, s−i(θ′), θ′
)∣∣ θ]
when θ is an imprecise signal of θ′, with noise θ′ − θ distributed according to density
g(·). Thus, in the long-run, the similarity-based learner behaves as if she observes only
a noisy signal of the true state. Theorem 4.1 makes this connection precise by showing
that players learn to play strategies that would be serially undominated in a modified
game of incomplete information in which each holds these (subjective) beliefs about
the information structure.
The long-run outcome of the learning process may be identified by solving this
modified game. Suppose that both players follow cut-off strategies with threshold θ∗;
that is, both choose Action 0 at signals below θ∗ and Action 1 at signals above θ∗. Each
player assigns probability 12 to the true state being greater than her own signal. Since
each believes that the other player observes the true state, a player who receives exactly
the threshold signal θ∗ believes that the other player chooses Action 1 with probability
1
2 . In order for this strategy profile to be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, players must
be indifferent between their two actions at the threshold signal. Therefore, θ∗ is the
unique solution to
1
2
U(1, 0, θ) +
1
2
U(1, 1, θ) = 0. (3)
This equilibrium turns out to be the unique serially undominated strategy profile in
the modified game, and therefore the unique long-run outcome of the learning process
in the original game.
The condition defining the threshold in Equation 3 is identical to the condition
defining the unique equilibrium threshold in global games with the same payoff struc-
ture (but with common priors over the structure of the noise). This agreement does
not generally hold if similarity functions are asymmetric or there are more than two
players. We leave a detailed discussion of this comparison to Section 5 below.
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3 The Learning Process
The learning process is comprised of an estimation procedure by which players esti-
mate payoffs of actions together with a strategic environment in which they repeatedly
interact. We are interested in environments in which players continually face new
strategic problems, and each time are uncertain of the payoffs they will receive from
each of their available actions. This uncertainty may result from imperfect knowledge
of the payoff function, or simply from not knowing opponents’ strategies. Since the
strategic problem is new, players draw on their experience with similar past problems
to estimate their current payoffs.
A fixed set of I ≥ 2 players interact in a one-parameter family of games Γ(θ). The
state θ is drawn from a compact, convex set Θ ⊂ RN . The action set Ai available to
each player i is the same across all states in Θ. Each set Ai is assumed to be finite. As
usual, we will write A = ×Ii=1Ai for the set of action profiles.
The payoff function of each player i will be denoted by U i(θ, a) for a ∈ A. In order
to capture varying degrees of initial knowledge of payoff functions, we write the payoff
function as
U i
(
θ, ai, a−i
)
= ui
(
θ, ai, vi
(
θ, ai, a−i
))
,
with vi : Θ × A −→ V i for some arbitrary set V i, and ui : Θ × Ai × V i −→ R. The
interpretation of these functions is that player i knows the functional form of ui(·, ·, ·),
but cannot predict the value of the function vi(·, ·) based on the values of θ and ai
alone. Each player estimates the value of vi(·, ·, ·) using values observed in similar past
situations.
The learning process is comprised of three elements:
1. An initial strategy si0 : Θ −→ Ai for each player i.
2. A similarity function gi : Θ × Θ −→ R+ for each player i, where, for each θ,
g(θ, ·) is integrable.
3. A continuous distribution Φ over states Θ with full support and continuous density
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φ(·).2
In each period t = 0, 1, . . ., Nature draws a state θt according to the distribution Φ.
Draws are independent across periods. Each player perfectly observes θt, then chooses
an action ai ∈ Ai based on her experience in similar states θs, weighted according to
the degree of similarity gi(θs, θt).
If
∑
s<t g
i(θs, θt) = 0, then Player i simply follows her initial strategy and chooses
action ait = s
i
0(θt). The interpretation of this case is that Player i perceives all past
data to be irrelevant to the problem in state θt, and hence ignores it. All of our results
below are independent of the initial strategies used by players in the learning process.3
If, on the other hand,
∑
s<t g
i(θs, θt) > 0, then Player i chooses action ait according
to
ait ∈ argmax
ai∈Ai
∑
s<t u
i
(
θt, a
i, vi
(
θs, a
i, a−is
))
gi (θs, θt)∑
s<t g
i (θs, θt) .
(4)
This action choice may be interpreted as if each player assigns particular beliefs to the
unknown value V it (a
i) = vi(θt, ai, a−it ) for each ai; namely,
Pr
(
V it (a
i) = v
)
=
∑
s<t g
i(θs, θt)1l
(
v
(
θs, a
i, a−is
)
= v
)∑
s<t g
i (θs, θt)
.
These are precisely the beliefs that would arise if players used kernel estimators to
estimate the distribution of V it (a
i) conditional on the state θt using the kernel function
gi(·, θt).
Following any history ht = (θs, as)t−1s=0, the learning process defines a strategy s
i
t :
Θ −→ Ai for each player describing the action that would be chosen at each possible
state θ if the realized state was θt = θ. The process therefore gives rise to a probability
distribution over sequences of strategy profiles (s0, s1, . . .). All probabilistic results
below are with respect to this distribution.
In order to form the payoff estimates in (4), Player i must only observe values
2The modified game result, Theorem 4.1, also holds for discrete distributions over Θ; in fact, the proof
for the discrete case is much simpler. Our main focus, however, will be on the continuous case, which better
captures the idea that players cannot learn from repeated interaction in the same game.
3All of our results hold without modification if, instead of an initial strategy, players begin with an
arbitrary finite history of play that is sufficiently rich to prevent the case
∑
s<t g
i(θs, θt) = 0 from occurring.
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of vi(·, ·, ·) at the end of each period s given the state θs and the actions a−is of the
opponents in that period. However, Player i must observe the value of vi(θs, ai, a−is ) for
every action ai ∈ Ai, regardless of the action she actually chose in Period s. In some
instances of the learning process, the value of vi(θs, ai, a−is ) does not depend on ai. In
other cases, however, players must observe certain counterfactual values of vi. The role
of these counterfactuals is to prevent players from failing to learn simply because they
never take a particular action. The model may thus be viewed as an approximation
of one in which players choose according to the preceding rules with high probability
in each period, but experiment with some small independent probability by choosing
a random action from Ai.
The learning process may be viewed as an extension of fictitious play to an envi-
ronment in which the game is changing. If the state θt is fixed over all periods t, then
the learning process reduces to standard fictitious play.
The general learning model encompasses two procedures of particular interest:
• Payoff-based learning: A particular example of the model arises when players
initially know nothing about the payoff structure. Let ui
(
θ, ai, vi
) ≡ vi and
let vi
(
θ, ai, a−i
) ≡ U i (θ, ai, a−i). Under this specification, at the end of each
round s, the players observe only the payoffs they received or would have received
for each action ai ∈ Ai. Each player then chooses her action to maximize a
weighted average of these observed payoffs, where the weights are determined
by the similarity between the current state and each previous one. Players in
this learning process are strategically na¨ıve in the sense that they do not reason
about the actions of other players; indeed, they treat the problem simply as a
single-person decision problem with unknown payoffs.
• Strategy-based learning: Another instance of the general learning model is the
case of players who fully understand the payoff function U(θ, ai, a−i) and need
only estimate the opponents’ action profile at θt. Formally, take vi
(
θ, ai, a−i
) ≡
a−i and ui
(
θ, ai, vi
) ≡ U(θ, ai, vi). The informational feedback required for this
process is minimal: each player observes only her opponents’ actions a−is at the
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end of each period s.
The players in the learning process are case-based decision makers (Gilboa and
Schmeidler (2001)) in a strategic environment. Alternatively, our players may be
viewed as statisticians satisfying the axioms of Billot et al. (2005). These statisti-
cians seek to predict the outcome of an action based on a database of outcomes in
similar cases. The authors prove that if the order of cases in the database is irrelevant,
and if a combination of two databases leads to a convex combination of beliefs gener-
ated by the original databases, then the agents form beliefs using similarity-weighted
averages.4
The irrelevance axiom of Billot et al. (2005) does not preclude players from putting
more weight on more recent cases. We rule out time-dependent similarity functions in
order to simplify the analysis. More generally, one could suppose that observations are
discounted over time according to a nonincreasing sequence δ(τ) ∈ (0, 1] by modifying
equation (4) to include an additional factor of δ(t−s) in both sums. In the undiscounted
model, the convergence results presented below rely on the property that changes in
payoff estimates in a single round become negligible once players have accumulated
enough experience. Since this property continues to hold as long as the series
∑∞
τ=0 δ(τ)
diverges, we conjecture that all of our results hold in this more general setting. If, on
the other hand, this sum converges, then the situation becomes more complicated,
as the learning process will not converge in general. It is therefore not possible for
the long-run behavior to agree with that of the undiscounted process in every round.
However, as long as memory is “sufficiently long,” we expect this agreement to occur in
a large fraction of rounds. For example, if memory is discounted exponentially, so that
δ(τ) = ρτ for some ρ ∈ (0, 1), then we expect play to be consistent with our results
most of the time when ρ is close to 1.
We impose the following technical assumptions on the learning process:
A1. Bounded payoffs: there exist upper and lower bounds on ui(θ, ai, vi) uniformly
4This connection is subject to the caveat that Billot et al. assume a finite outcome space, whereas the
outcome space is infinite here.
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over all (θ, ai, vi) ∈ Θ×Ai × V i.
A2. Each similarity function gi is bounded.
The following assumption ensures that players eventually obtain relevant data for
every state:
A3. For each θ,
∫
Θ φ(θ
′)gi(θ′, θ)dθ′ > 0.
We require the following continuity assumption:
A4. For every ai and a−i, the expression ui
(
θ, ai, vi
(
θ′, ai, a−i
))
gi(θ′, θ) is continuous
in θ uniformly over all θ′.5
Note that the continuity in Assumption A4 is uniform over
(
θ, θ′, ai, a−i
) ∈ Θ×Θ×Ai×
A−i because Θ is compact and the actions sets are finite. Also note that in the case of
Payoff-Based Learning described above, Assumption A4 holds if gi(θ′, θ) is continuous.
4 Long-run Characterization
In this section, we characterize the long-run outcomes of the learning process from
Section 3 in terms of the equilibria of a particular game, which we call the modified
game. We begin by informally outlining an observation that lies at the core of this
connection, before the formal statement in Theorem 4.1.
Suppose that the learning process converges to a time-invariant strategy profile
s(θ). By the law of large numbers, Player i’s long-run estimated payoff for action ai in
state θt against the profile s−i(t) approaches
∫
Θ u
i
(
θt, a
i, vi
(
θ, ai, s−i(θ)
))
φ(θ)gi (θ, θt) dθ∫
Θ φ(θ
′)gi (θ′, θt) dθ′
=
∫
Θ
ui
(
θt, a
i, vi
(
θ, ai, s−i(θ)
))
qi(θ|θt)dθ,
where
qi (θ|θt) = φ(θ)g
i (θ, θt)∫
Θ φ(θ
′)gi (θ′, θt) dθ′
. (5)
5Formally, for each ai and a−i, given any ε > 0, there exists some δ > 0 (independent of θ and θ′) such
that
∣∣ui (θ, ai, vi (θ′, ai, a−i)) gi(θ′, θ)− ui (θ′′, ai, vi (θ′, ai, a−i)) gi(θ′, θ′′)∣∣ < ε whenever |θ − θ′′| < δ.
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That is, Player i’s expected estimated payoff at state θt against the strategy profile
s−i(θ) coincides with the expected payoff against the same strategy profile of a player
with payoffs ui
(
θt, a
i, vi
(
θ, ai, s−i(θ)
))
and beliefs qi (θ|θt) over the state θ.
The virtual conditional belief qi (θ|θt) has a convenient interpretation. Suppose
that the state θ is drawn according to the distribution Φ(·), and Player i observes
only a noisy signal θt of θ, where the signal is conditionally distributed according to
density g
i(θ,·)R
Θ g
i(θ,θ′)dθ′ . Then q
i(θ|θt) is precisely the density describing Player i’s posterior
beliefs over θ after observing the signal θt. This interpretation motivates the following
definition:
Definition 4.1. The modified game is a Bayesian game with heterogenous priors. The
players i ∈ {1, . . . , I} simultaneously choose actions ai ∈ Ai, where each Ai is finite.
The state space is given by Ω = ΘI+1, with typical member
(
θ, θ1, . . . , θI
)
, where each
θi denotes the type of Player i, and θ is a common payoff parameter. Each player i has
payoff function ui
(
θi, ai, vi(θ, ai, a−i)
)
. Player i assigns probability 1 to the event that
θj = θ for all j 6= i, and has prior beliefs over (θ, θi) given by the density φ(θ)gi(θ, θi).
Whereas the class of games Γ(θ) describes the actual environment in which the
players interact, the modified game describes a virtual setting with no direct inter-
pretation in terms of reasoning or beliefs in the learning process. The modified game
merely provides a useful tool for studying the learning outcomes because the learning
process converges, in a sense that will be made precise below, to the set of strategies
that are serially undominated in the modified game.
For any game with subjective priors, we may define (interim) dominated strategies
in the same way as for Bayesian games with common priors.6 In fact, we will also use
a stronger form of dominance in which the payoff difference exceeds some fixed pi ≥ 0.
Consider any function ai : Θ −→ 2Ai . We interpret ai(θ) as the set of admissible
actions for Player i at type θ. The profiles
(
ai
)
i
and
(
aj
)
j 6=i will be denoted, as usual,
as a and a−i respectively.
6Since no other notion of domination will be employed here, we henceforth drop the term “interim” and
refer simply to “dominated strategies.”
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Definition 4.2. A strategy si(·) is said to be consistent with ai(·) if si(θ) ∈ ai(θ) for
all θ ∈ Θ. A strategy profile s−i(·) is said to be consistent with a−i(·) if each component
of s−i(·) is consistent with the corresponding component of a−i(·).
For any profile a(·), action ai ∈ ai(θ) is said to be pi-dominated7 at θ under the
profile a(·) if there exists ai′ ∈ ai(θ) such that for all s−i(·) consistent with a−i(·),
Eq(θ′|θ)
[
ui
(
θ, ai
′
, vi
(
θ′, ai′, s−i(θ′)
))
− ui (θ, ai, vi (θ′, ai, s−i(θ′)))∣∣∣ θ] > pi.
We define iterated elimination of pi-dominated strategies in the usual way. For each i
and pi > 0, let ai0,pi(θ) ≡ Ai. For k = 1, 2, . . ., define aik,pi(θ) to be the set of actions
that are not pi-dominated for Type θ of Player i under the profile ak−1,pi(·). The set of
serially pi-undominated actions for Type θ of Player i is given by ai∞,pi(θ) =
⋂
k a
i
k,pi(θ).
Since pi-domination agrees with the usual notion of strict dominance when pi = 0, we
will drop the prefix pi in that case.
The need to consider pi-domination instead of ordinary strict domination arises
because of the difference between estimated payoffs following finite histories and their
long-run expectations. In the proof of Theorem 4.1 below, we show that for any pi > 0,
estimated payoffs under the learning process almost surely eventually lie within pi of
the corresponding expected payoffs in the modified game. It follows that actions that
are pi-dominated in the modified game will (almost surely eventually) not be played
under the learning process. The following lemma shows that considering pi-domination
for arbitrary pi > 0 suffices to prove the result for pi = 0, that is, for strict domination.
Lemma 4.1. Fix any type θ of Player i in the modified game and any k ∈ N. If
ai /∈ aik,0(θ), then there exists some pi > 0 such that ai /∈ aik,pi(θ).
Proof. See appendix.
The main result of this section, given in the following theorem, shows that, in the
long-run, players will not play strategies that are serially dominated in the modified
7The notion of pi-domination should not be confused with the unrelated concept of p-dominance that has
appeared in the literature on higher-order beliefs.
14
game. Note that strategies in each period of the learning process are defined over states
Θ, which is identical to the type space for each player in the modified game. Strategies
sit(·) under the learning process may therefore be identified with strategies si(·) in the
modified game; to keep notation simple, we will not distinguish between the two.
Theorem 4.1. 1. For any k ∈ N and any pi > 0, the strategy profiles st(·) under the
learning process are almost surely eventually consistent with ak,pi(·).8
2. The probability that the action profile in period t under the learning dynamics is
consistent with the set of serially undominated strategies at θt in the modified game
approaches one as time tends to infinity; that is,
Pr
(
sit(θt) is consistent with a
i
∞,0(θt) ∀i
)→ 1
as t→∞.
Proof. See appendix.
Using the Strong Law of Large Numbers, it is relatively straightforward to show that
in a given state against a fixed strategy, the long-run payoff estimate in the learning
process approaches the expected payoff in the modified game. The main difficulty
in the proof of the preceding theorem arises because, in order for the analogue of
iterated elimination of dominated strategies to occur under the learning dynamics,
players must learn not to play dominated actions in finite time at an uncountable set
of states. Accordingly, the proof demonstrates that it is possible to reduce the problem
to one involving a finite state space while introducing only an arbitrarily small error
in the payoff estimates.
The concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium with subjective priors is difficult to justify
based on learning in a fixed game (see Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (2004)). When
players learn by similarity, long-run behaviour corresponds naturally to equilibrium
behaviour with subjective priors. Even when similarity is very narrowly concentrated,
8Recall that a property holds eventually if there exists some T such the property holds for all t ≥ T .
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so that, in a sense, differences in the corresponding priors are “small”, the consequences
for behaviour can be significant, as demonstrated in the following section.
5 Coordination Games
We now focus on learning by similarity in a class of symmetric coordination games Γ(θ),
where the distribution Φ(θ) has support Θ = [θ, θ]. Each of I players chooses between
two actions, 0 and 1. The players share an identical payoff function. We normalize the
payoff from Action 0 to be 0 in every state θ against every action profile. We denote by
U (θ, l) the payoff from choosing Action 1 in state θ when l ∈ {0, . . . , I − 1} opponents
choose action 1.
The similarity function is identical across players, and depends only on the difference
θ′ − θ between states, and a parameter τ > 0 according to
gi(θ′, θ) ≡ 1
τ
g
(
θ′ − θ
τ
)
,
where g : R −→ R+. We will focus on outcomes in the limit as τ tends to 0, where
similarity is narrowly concentrated on nearby states. Away from this limit, similarity-
based learning generally leads to inconsistent payoff estimates even if the opponents’
strategies are fixed. When τ is small, if play converges, these inconsistencies become
small except possibly in states close to discontinuities in payoffs.
As before, the learning process may take different forms depending on the feedback
players receive over time. To capture this, we write the payoff to Action 1 as
U(θ, l) = u (θ, v(θ, l)) .
Whenever
∑
s<t g
(
θs−θt
τ
)
> 0, the estimated payoff for Action 0 is simply 0, and that
for Action 1 is given by
∑
s<t u (θt, v(θs, ls))
1
τ g
(
θs−θt
τ
)∑
s<t
1
τ g
(
θs−θt
τ
) .
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In addition to the general assumptions from Section 3, we assume the following:
A5. State Monotonicity: The payoffs u(θ, 0) and u(θ, I − 1) are strictly increasing
in θ.
A6. Extremal Payoffs at Extremal Profiles: For all l = 0, . . . , I−1 and all θ ∈ Θ,
u(θ, 0) ≤ u(θ, l) ≤ u(θ, I − 1).9
A7. Dominance Regions: There exist some θ′, θ′ ∈ (θ, θ) such that Action 0 is
dominant at every state below θ′ and Action 1 is dominant at every state above
θ
′.
A8. Continuity: The payoffs u(θ, 0) and u(θ, I − 1) are continuous in θ .
Note that, since gi(θ, ·) is a probability density function, so is g(·). Let G(·) be the
distribution function corresponding to the density g(·). Define the threshold θ∗ to be
the (unique) solution to
G(0)u(θ, 0) + (1−G(0))u(θ, I − 1) = 0. (6)
The existence of this solution is guaranteed by the existence of dominance regions
(Assumption A7), and its uniqueness by state monotonicity (Assumption A5).
Proposition 5.1. For any δ > 0, there exists τ > 0 such that for any τ ∈ (0, τ), in
the learning process with parameter τ , the probability that all players choose Action 0
conditional on θt < θ∗−δ and Action 1 conditional on θt > θ∗+δ tends to 1 as t→∞.
This proposition provides a stark contrast to learning in a fixed game. If instead of
varying in each period, the state θ was fixed over all periods, then the learning process
reduces to standard fictitious play (as long as gi(θ, θ) > 0). For any θ outside of the
dominance regions, there would be multiple long-run learning outcomes that depend
on the initial strategies used by players in the game. For instance, if all players are
initially coordinated on one of the two actions, then they will continue to choose this
9The extremal payoff assumption is essentially a weakened form of strategic complementarity, which
differs from full strategic complementarity in not requiring that u(θ, l′) ≥ u(θ, l) if 0 < l < l′ < I − 1.
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action in every period. In contrast, Proposition 5.1 indicates that extrapolation from
different past states may lead to a unique long-run outcome in many of these states θ,
independent of the initial strategies players use in the learning process.
The following proof draws on techniques from the proofs of Propositions 2.1 and
2.2 in Morris and Shin (2003) for the corresponding result in global games.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Definemτ (θ, k) to be the expected payoff to Action 1 for type
θ in the modified game when the opponents play a threshold strategy with threshold
k. That is
mτ (θ, k) ≡
∫ k
θ φ(θ
′) 1τ g
(
θ′−θ
τ
)
u (θ, v(θ′, 0)) dθ′ +
∫ θ
k φ(θ
′) 1τ g
(
θ′−θ
τ
)
u (θ, v(θ′, I − 1)) dθ′∫
Θ φ(θ˜)
1
τ g
(
θ˜−θ
τ
)
dθ˜
.
(7)
First, we prove that Action 0 is serially dominated for θ > θ∗ and Action 1 is
serially dominated for θ < θ∗, where θ∗ and θ∗ are, respectively, the maximal and
minimal roots of mτ (θ, θ) = 0.10 Note that the function mτ (θ, k) is continuous and
decreasing in k. Moreover, for sufficiently small τ , the existence of dominance regions
(Assumption A7) implies that mτ (θ, k) is negative for small enough values of θ and
positive for large enough values.
Let θ0 = θ, and for k = 1, 2, . . ., recursively define θk to be the maximal solution to
the equation
mτ (θ, θk−1) = 0.
Let Sk denote the set of strategies remaining for each player after k rounds of deletion
of dominated strategies. We will prove by induction that Action 0 is dominated for all
types of each player above θk against profiles of strategies from the set Sk−1. Suppose
that the claim holds for k − 1. By Assumption A6, if opponents play strategies in
Sk−1, then the payoff to Action 1 for any type θ is at least as large as if every opponent
10One could alternatively prove this statement by applying Theorem 5 of Milgrom and Roberts’ (1990)
to the ex ante game (in which heterogeneous priors are no longer an issue). However, the direct argument
given here better illustrates the process of contagion, and avoids technical issues that arise in moving to the
ex ante game.
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played a cut-off strategy with threshold θk−1 (i.e. a strategy choosing Action 0 at any
type below θk−1 and Action 1 at any type above θk−1). Hence the expected payoff
for Action 1 at θ is at least mτ (θ, θk−1) regardless of which strategies from Sk−1 are
chosen by the opponents. This expected payoff must be positive above the maximal
root θk because mτ (θ, ·) is continuous everywhere and positive for sufficiently large θ.
Therefore, Action 0 is dominated above θk, as claimed.
Next, we show by induction that (θk)∞k=1 is a nonincreasing sequence. Note first
that θ1 ≤ θ0 trivially because θ0 lies at the upper boundary of Θ. Suppose that θk−1 ≤
θk−2. Then mτ (θ, θk−1) ≥ mτ (θ, θk−2) because mτ (θ, k) decreases in k, and hence the
maximal root of mτ (θ, θk−1) = 0 must be weakly smaller than that of mτ (θ, θk−2) = 0,
which establishes the induction step.
The nonincreasing sequence (θk)∞k=1 converges to some θ
∗ which, from the continuity
of mτ , must be a solution to mτ (θ, θ) = 0. Therefore, Action 0 is indeed serially
dominated at every type above θ∗. The symmetric argument from below establishes
that Action 1 is serially dominated below the minimal solution θ∗ of mτ (θ, θ) = 0.
Note that since
∫ θ+ε
θ−ε
1
τ g
(
θ′−θ
τ
)
dθ′ =
∫ ε
τ
−ε
τ
g (z) dz, given any δ > 0 and ε > 0, there
exists some τ > 0 such that for all τ ∈ (0, τ), ∫ θ+εθ−ε 1τ g ( θ′−θτ ) dθ′ > 1− δ. In particular,
for any function ψ (·) that is continuous at θ, we have
lim
τ→0
∫
Θ
ψ
(
θ′
) 1
τ
g
(
θ′ − θ
τ
)
dθ′ = ψ (θ) , (8)
and similarly
lim
τ→0
∫ θ
−∞
ψ
(
θ′
) 1
τ
g
(
θ′ − θ
τ
)
dθ′ = ψ (θ)G(0), (9)
and lim
τ→0
∫ +∞
θ
ψ
(
θ′
) 1
τ
g
(
θ′ − θ
τ
)
dθ′ = ψ (θ) (1−G(0)). (10)
Moreover the convergence of the limits in Equations (8) through (10) is uniform over
θ in some set X as long as the function ψ(θ) is uniformly continuous on X.
Applying Equations (8) through (10) to the definition of mτ (θ, θ) from Equation
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(7) gives
lim
τ→0
mτ (θ, θ) = G(0)u(θ, v(θ, 0)) + (1−G(0))u(θ, v(θ, I − 1))
= G(0)U(θ, 0) + (1−G(0))U(θ, I − 1)
on the open interval (θ, θ). The convergence is uniform on any compact subinterval
of Θ since φ(θ), u(θ, 0) and u(θ, I − 1) are uniformly continuous on compact sets. We
can choose such a compact subinterval Θ of (θ, θ) to intersect with both dominance
regions, so that all roots of mτ (θ, θ) = 0 must lie in Θ. Define m(θ) ≡ limτ→0mτ (θ, θ)
for θ ∈ Θ. Given any neighbourhood N of the unique root θ∗ ofm(θ), there exists some
ε > 0 such that m(θ) is uniformly bounded away from 0 by ε outside of N . Choosing
τ > 0 small enough so that whenever τ < τ , mτ (θ, θ) is within ε of m(θ) everywhere
on Θ guarantees that mτ (θ, θ) has no root in Θ \N .
Theorem 4.1 identifies a formal parallel between contagion through learning and
contagion through incomplete information in the modified game. This connection
explains in part why many features of the two kinds of contagion appear similar.
However, the information structure of the modified game is inherently different from
that of global games with a common prior. Consequently, important differences arise
between the outcomes of contagion through learning and those of contagion in global
games.
First, the equilibrium threshold in the standard binary action global game model
is independent of the noise distribution, while the threshold in the similarity learning
model depends on the similarity function g(·) (which determines the noise distribution
in the modified game). The noise-independence result in global games is driven by the
common prior, which generates, in equilibrium, uniform beliefs over l at the threshold
type regardless of the noise distribution. With learning by similarity, beliefs over l
at the threshold in the modified game depend on g(·) because of the heterogeneity of
the priors. In fact, Equation (6) indicates that the threshold θ∗ falls if we replace the
similarity function g(·) with some function g˜(·) that first-order stochastically dominates
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g(·). The similarity function g˜(·) may be interpreted as more optimistic than g(·) since
it places more weight on better past states. Under this interpretation, optimism leads
to more efficient coordination. Izmalkov and Yildiz (2007) obtain a similar result in a
game with subjective priors closely related to the modified game studied here.
Moreover, without further restricting the similarity function, any threshold θ∗ out-
side the dominance regions can arise as an outcome of learning for an appropriately
chosen similarity function. This indeterminacy is consistent with the result of Wein-
stein and Yildiz (2007) that any equilibrium of any complete information game can
be uniquely selected by an appropriate choice of perturbation in the universal type
space. In the environment considered here, the particular perturbations that arise
in the modified game as g(·) varies suffice to uniquely select any equilibrium in each
complete information game Γ(θ).
Second, the outcome of contagion through learning generally differs from that in
global games even if we restrict attention to symmetric similarity functions, for which
G(0) = 12 . This restriction must hold if similarity weights are symmetric in the sense
that θ receives the same weight at θ′ that θ′ receives at θ. Under this restriction, the
threshold θ∗ solves
u(θ∗, 0) + u(θ∗, I − 1)
2
= 0, (11)
while the standard global game threshold solves
I−1∑
l=0
u(θ∗, l)
I
= 0. (12)
These thresholds generally differ if payoffs are not linear in l. Moreover, the outcome
threshold of the learning model is independent of the payoffs u(·, l) for values of l other
than 0 and I−1. In the modified game, the threshold player places zero probability on
these intermediate values of l, and thus the model does not require full monotonicity of
u(·, l) with respect to l. In global games with common priors, the threshold player has
uniform beliefs over l, and full strategic complementarity is required for equilibrium
uniqueness.
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6 Related Literature
Processes of learning from similar games have been examined in several papers, which
typically define similarity by an equivalence relation on a given set of games (Germano
(2004), Katz (1996), LiCalzi (1995), Mengel (2007)). Jehiel and Koessler (2006) study
an equilibrium concept in Bayesian games in which players partition states into analogy
classes. Each player best responds to the strategy obtained by averaging opponents’
strategies within each analogy class. These analogy classes can be viewed as arising
from particular similarity functions in our learning model; however, the motivation is
quite different. Whereas we propose similarity as a means of making inferences from
different past situations, Jehiel and Koessler’s analogies are based on players’ inability
to distinguish information obtained in various states. Their focus therefore centers
on interesting deviations from standard equilibrium behavior arising from persistent
errors in beliefs. We, on the other hand, focus on the case in which these errors are
small, leading to a selection among equilibria. Furthermore, the contagion process that
forms the focus of the present paper is precluded by their partition model of analogies
since states cannot influence one another across elements of the partition.
A related departure from Bayesian Nash equilibrium is Eyster and Rabin’s (2005)
concept of cursed equilibrium. Players beliefs assign some probability to their oppo-
nents’ true strategy profile and the remaining probability to the simplified, constant
action profile, which is required to be correct “on average”. Like Jehiel and Koessler,
Eyster and Rabin use their model to capture large deviations from rational play.
Stahl and Van Huyck (2002) demonstrate learning from similar games experimen-
tally. Subjects repeatedly interacted in Stag Hunt games randomly drawn from a
particular set, with the set varied under two different experimental treatments. The
observed long-run behavior in a particular game contained in both sets varied across
the treatments, indicating that subjects were influenced by their experience playing
different games.
Carlsson (2004) proposes an evolutionary justification of global games equilibrium
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using strategy-based learning by similarity. Carlsson offers an informal argument to
suggest that the learning process can be approximated by the best-response dynamics
of a modified game. Theorem 4.1 above formalizes this result in terms of long-run out-
comes. The outcome of the learning process coincides with the global game prediction
in Carlsson’s two-player model. With more than two players, Proposition 5.1 above
indicates that the learning outcome generally shares only the qualitative features of
the global game solution, while quantitatively they differ.
Argenziano and Gilboa (2005) study multiplicity of similarity-based learning out-
comes in coordination problems. With finitely many states, the long-run outcome
depends on historical accidents when games with dominant actions are sufficiently
rare.
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) study supermodular games, of which the coordination
environment studied here is a special case, and show that only serially undominated
strategies are played in the long-run under a large class of adaptive dynamics. These
dynamics, however, require that players adjust to the full strategies of their opponents.
In games with large state spaces, where play of the game (at most) reveals the actions
s(θt) assigned by strategies s(·) to the particular states θt that are drawn, such dynamics
are difficult to justify. The use of similarity in learning can be seen as generating
“close to” adaptive dynamics, as reflected in the modified serially undominated result
of Theorem 4.1 below.11
An alternative approach to learning in certain binary action supermodular games
is offered by Beggs (2005). Play almost surely converges to an equilibrium of the game
if players follow learning rules that adapt threshold strategies based on payoffs from
similar types.
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Figure 2: Atlas of Contagion
7 Discussion and Conclusion
Morris (1997) identified a formal relationship between contagion across types in in-
complete information games and contagion across players in local interaction games.
Starting with some incomplete information game, one may reinterpret the types in the
game as players situated in various locations. Each of these players interacts with some
subset of the population, her neighbours, and must choose the same action against all
opponents. Payoffs in the local interaction game are obtained by a weighted sum of
payoffs from interactions with all neighbours, where the weights correspond to the pos-
terior beliefs over opponents’ types in the incomplete information game (see Morris
(1997) for details).
The model of learning by similarity discussed here may be reinterpreted in the same
way. Each player may instead be viewed as a population of players with locations θ ∈ Θ.
11In addition, Samuelson and Zhang (1992), Nachbar (1990) and Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel (2007)
identify classes of learning processes under which players learn not to play serially dominated strategies.
However, all three papers assume finite or real-valued strategy spaces. The strategy space in our environment,
consisting of functions s : Θ −→ {0, 1}, is larger.
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In every period, players at a randomly drawn location are matched to play a game Γ(θ).
Players estimate payoffs based on other players’ experience at nearby locations. Thus
learning by similarity corresponds to learning from neighbours. Since this is merely a
formal reinterpretation, the modified game result also holds in this setting. As a game of
incomplete information, the modified game may be reinterpreted according to Morris
(1997) as a local interaction game. The only difference from the usual case is that
the heterogeneous priors in the modified game correspond to asymmetric weighting of
payoffs in the corresponding local interaction game; thus, for instance, Player i’s payoff
may depend on Player j’s action even if Player j’s payoff does not depend on Player
i’s action.
The formal connections among the three sources of contagion described here are
summarized in Figure 7. Contagion through learning is related to contagion in Bayesian
games through the equivalence of outcomes with the modified game (Theorem 4.1). The
modified games that arise in this way differ from global games because of heteroge-
neous priors. Each of these may be reinterpreted according to (Morris 1997) as local
interaction games, with heterogeneous priors corresponding to asymmetric weights and
common priors to symmetric weights. Learning by similarity may also be reinterpreted
directly as learning from neighbours in local interaction, where the modified game re-
sult describes an equivalence of outcomes with certain local interaction games with
asymmetric payoff weights.
An earlier version of this paper (Steiner and Stewart 2006) considers learning by
similarity in games with incomplete information. The environment is close to that of
Section 5, except that each player receives only a noisy signal xit = θt+σε
i
t of the state
θt in each period t. Players estimate payoffs based on payoffs from similar past types.
The modified game result of Theorem 4.1 extends naturally to this setting, and may
be used to demonstrate that there is a unique outcome of learning when both σ and τ
are small. This outcome depends on the ratio στ . If σ is small relative to τ , then we
recover the complete information learning outcome of Proposition 5.1 above. If σ is
large relative to τ , then we recover the usual global game solution.
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The theory of global games has shown that relaxing the common knowledge as-
sumption in games in a particular way can lead to a unique selection among multiple
equilibria. This paper identifies a similar effect that arises under learning if we re-
lax the assumption that players learn from repeated play in exactly the same game.
Moreover, the learning outcome is formally related to the equilibria of a global game
with subjective priors, which we have called the modified game. While the connection
to the modified game is very general, the set of learning outcomes may be difficult to
identify in games outside of the coordination environment studied here. The unique
outcome of learning in this environment relies on the dominance solvability of the mod-
ified game. In more general settings, learning outcomes correspond to rationalizable
profiles of the game when beliefs are perturbed in a particular way that depends on the
similarity function. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) have shown that for any game, given
any rationalizable strategy profile, there exists a perturbation of beliefs in the univer-
sal type space for which this profile is uniquely rationalizable. A natural question,
then, is whether the corresponding result holds under learning by similarity; in other
words, whether the class of perturbations that may be obtained in the modified game
by varying the similarity function is large enough to uniquely select each equilibrium.
A Appendix
Lemma A.1. For any ε > 0, there exists some δ > 0 such that changing the opponents’
strategies on a set of type profiles of Lebesgue measure at most δ changes the expected
payoff of every type of Player i from each action ai by at most ε.
Proof of Lemma A.1. Denote i’s expected payoff from Action ai at Type θ against the
profile s−i(·) by
U˜ i
(
θ, ai, s−i(·)) = ∫Θ ui (θ, ai, vi (θ′, ai, s−i(θ′)))φ(θ′)gi (θ′, θ) dθ′∫
Θ φ(θ˜)g
i(θ˜, θ)dθ˜
.
The denominator is bounded above zero because it is continuous and positive by As-
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sumption A3, and hence attains a positive minimum on the compact set Θ. Recall that
the functions ui(·) , gi(·), and φ(·) are bounded by assumption. Hence there exists a
constant K such that if s−i(·) changes only on a set of measure δ, then the numerator
changes by at most Kδ.
Lemma A.2. Fix a profile a(·) and an arbitrary action ai. For any δ > 0, there exists
some pi > 0 such that the set of types of Player i for which action ai is dominated but
not pi-dominated under the profile a(·) has measure at most δ.
Proof of Lemma A.2. Consider any decreasing sequence pi1, pi2, ... such that limn→∞ pin =
0. Let Θ (n) denote the set of types for which Action ai is pin-dominated under a(·),
and let Θ denote the set of types for which ai is dominated under a(·). Then Θ (n) is
a monotone sequence of sets, and it suffices to show that limn→∞Θ(n) = Θ.
Suppose for contradiction that Θ \ limn→∞Θ(n) contains some type θ. Then there
exists some action ai′ that dominates ai at θ under the profile a(·), but does not
pi-dominate ai at θ under a(·) for any pi > 0. Hence we have
inf
s−i(·)∈a−i(·)
U˜ i
(
θ, ai′, s−i(·))− U˜ i (θ, ai, s−i(·)) = 0,
where we abuse notation by writing s−i(·) ∈ a−i(·) to mean that s−i(·) is consistent
with a−i(·). Define a strategy profile s−i(·) by choosing
s−i(θ′) ∈ argmin
a−i∈a−i(θ′)
ui
(
θ, ai′, vi(θ′, ai′, a−i)
)− ui (θ, ai, vi(θ′, ai, a−i))
for each θ′. The profile s−i(·) is consistent with a−i(·), and satisfies
U˜ i
(
θ, ai′, s−i(·))−U˜ i (θ, ai, s−i(·)) = inf
s−i(·)∈a−i(·)
U˜ i
(
θ, ai′, s−i(·))−U˜ i (θ, ai, s−i(·)) = 0,
contradicting that ai′ dominates ai at θ under a(·).
Lemma A.3. For any k and θ, we have aik,pi(θ) ⊆ aik,pi′(θ) whenever pi ≤ pi′.
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Proof of Lemma A.3. Note that the statement is trivial for k = 0. Suppose for in-
duction that the statement holds for k (for all θ). We need to show that if ai is
pi′-dominated at θ under ak,pi′ then ai is pi-dominated at θ under ak,pi. Accordingly,
suppose that ai is pi′-dominated at θ under ak,pi′ ; that is, there exists ai′ ∈ aik,pi′ for
which
U˜
(
θ, ai′, s−i(·))− U˜ (θ, ai, s−i(·)) > pi′ for all s−i(·) consistent with a−ik,pi′ . (13)
Since, by the inductive hypothesis, we have a−ik,pi ⊆ a−ik,pi′ , Inequality (13) implies
U˜
(
θ, ai′, s−i(·))− U˜ (θ, ai, s−i(·)) > pi for all s−i(·) consistent with a−ik,pi. (14)
If ai′ ∈ aik,pi(θ), then we are done. Otherwise, there exists some ai′′ ∈ aik,pi(θ) such that
ai′′ dominates ai′ at θ under the profile ak,pi. Thus we have
U˜
(
θ, ai′′, s−i(·))− U˜ (θ, ai′, s−i(·)) > 0 for all s−i(·) consistent with a−ik,pi.
Combining this with Inequality (14) gives the result.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Given any type θ for which ai ∈ aik−1,0 \ aik,0, there exists some
pi (θ) > 0 such that, against any profile s−i(·) consistent with a−ik−1,0(·), the expected
payoff for some action ai′ ∈ aik,0(θ) is at least pi (θ) greater than that for Action ai.
By Lemma A.3, we have ai′ ∈ aik,pi(θ) for all pi > 0, and hence it suffices to show that
ai
′ dominates ai under the profile ak−1,pi(·) for some pi > 0. By Lemma A.1, it suffices
to show that given any δ > 0, there exists some pi > 0 small enough so that, for any
player i, aik−1,pi(·) differs from aik−1,0(·) on a set of measure at most δ.
We proceed by induction. The result is trivial for k = 1. For k > 1, assume for
induction that the result is true for k − 1; that is, assume that for any δ > 0, there
exists some pi > 0 for which aik−2,pi(·) differs from aik−2,0(·) on a set of measure at most
δ.
By Lemma A.2, given δ > 0, we can choose pi′ > 0 small enough so that the set
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of types of Player i for which a Action ai is dominated but not pi′-dominated under
ak−2,0 (·) has measure at most δ. By Lemma A.1, starting from any strategy profile,
there exists some δ′ > 0 such that changing the actions of at most a measure of δ′ of
the opponents’ types changes the expected payoff of each type of Player i by at most
pi′
4 . By the inductive hypothesis, we can choose pi
′′ > 0 such that a−ik−2,pi′′ (·) differs
from a−ik−2,0 (·) on a set of types of measure at most δ′. Consider pi = min
{
pi′
2 , pi
′′
}
.
We need to show that aik−1,pi (·) differs from aik−1,0 (·) on a set of types of measure at
most δ.
Consider any type θ and actions ai, ai′ ∈ a−ik−2,0(θ). By Lemma A.3, ai and ai′ also
belong to a−ik−2,pi(θ) for all pi > 0. Also by Lemma A.3, a
−i
k−2,pi (θ
′) ⊆ a−ik−2,pi′′ (θ′) for all
θ′. Therefore, we have
sup
s−i∈a−ik−2,pi(·)
[
U˜(θ, ai, s−i)− U˜(θ, ai′, s−i)
]
≤ sup
s−i∈a−i
k−2,pi′′ (·)
[
U˜(θ, ai, s−i)− U˜(θ, ai′, s−i)
]
,
(15)
where, as above, we write s−i ∈ a−ik,pi(·) to mean that the strategy profile s−i is consistent
with a−ik,pi(·). By the definition of pi′′, we have
sup
s−i∈a−i
k−2,pi′′ (·)
[
U˜(θ, ai, s−i)− U˜(θ, ai′, s−i)
]
≤ sup
s−i∈a−ik−2,0(·)
[
U˜(θ, ai, s−i)− U˜(θ, ai′, s−i) + pi
′
2
]
.
(16)
If Action ai is pi′-dominated by ai′ for Type θ of Player i under ak−2,0 (·), then
sup
s−i∈a−ik−2,0(·)
[
U˜(θ, ai, s−i)− U˜(θ, ai′, s−i) + pi
′
2
]
< −pi
′
2
.
Combining Inequalities (15) and (16) gives the following: if action ai is pi′-dominated
for i at Type θ under ak−2,0 (·), then ai must be pi′2 -dominated, and hence also pi-
dominated under ak−2,pi (·). Therefore, if, at some θ, ai is dominated under ak−2,0 (·)
but not pi-dominated under ak−2,pi (·), then ai is dominated under ak−2,0 (·) but not
pi′-dominated under ak−2,0 (·). The latter can happen only on a set of types of measure
δ.
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We have shown that the set of types θ for which ai ∈ aik−2,pi(θ) but ai /∈ aik−2,0(θ)
has measure at most δ. The result now follows since the number of players and the
number of actions are both finite.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Part (1). Assume for induction that there almost surely exists
some period after which the strategies sit(·) are consistent with aik−1,pi(·) .
In the first step, we consider payoff estimates at a fixed state θ∗. Suppose that
action ai is pi-dominated by some action ai′ for Type θ∗ of Player i in the modified
game under the profile ak−1,pi(·). Let
pi′ (θ∗) = pi
∫
Θ
gi (θ, θ∗) dΦ (θ) .
We will show that, under the learning process, there almost surely exists some period
after which the estimated payoff to Action ai′ at θ∗ exceeds that to Action ai by at
least pi. This will be the case if
1
t
∑
s<t
[
ui
(
θ∗, ai′, vi
(
θs, a
i′, a−is
))− ui (θ∗, ai, vi (θs, ai, a−is ))] gi (θs, θ∗) > pi′(θ∗). (17)
For each θ, θ′ and a−i, let
∆
(
θ, θ′, a−i
)
= ui
(
θ, ai′, vi
(
θ′, ai′, a−i
))− ui (θ, ai, vi (θ′, ai, a−i)) .
Keeping θ∗ fixed, choose the strategy profile s−imin (θ) to minimize the payoff advantage
of ai′ over ai at θ∗; that is,
s−imin (θ) ∈ argmin
a−i∈a−ik−1,pi(θ)
∆
(
θ∗, θ, a−i
)
.
Define a random variable
X = ∆
(
θ∗, θ, s−imin (θ)
)
gi (θ, θ∗) ,
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where the distribution of X is induced from the distribution Φ of θ.
By the inductive hypothesis, opponents play actions in a−ik−1,pi(θs) in every period
s ≥ t0 for some t0. For large enough t > t0, periods up to t0 receive an arbitrarily
small weight in each player’s payoff estimates. Thus assuming that a−is ∈ a−ik−1,pi(θs)
for all s introduces only an arbitrarily small error in the payoff estimates. Note that
for any history
(
θs, a
i
s, a
−i
s
)t−1
s=1
in which a−is ∈ a−ik−1,pi(θs), we have
1
t
∑
s<t
∆
(
θ∗, θs, a−is
)
gi (θs, θ∗) ≥ 1
t
∑
s<t
∆
(
θ∗, θs, s−imin (θs)
)
gi (θs, θ∗) ,
so it suffices to prove that (17) holds when a−is = s
−i
min (θs) for every s.
By the Strong Law of Large Numbers, the weighted payoff difference
1
t
∑
s<t
∆
(
θ∗, θs, s−imin (θs)
)
gi (θs, θ∗)
almost surely tends to the expectation of X, that is, to
∫
Θ
∆
(
θ∗, θ, s−imin(θ)
)
gi (θ, θ∗) dΦ (θ) .
By the assumption that ai′ pi-dominates ai, the last expression is greater than pi′(θ∗).
Therefore, there almost surely exists some round T such that Inequality (17) holds for
every t > T , as desired.
In the second step, we will show that there exists some δ > 0 such that if Inequality
(17) holds at θ∗, then sit(θ) 6= ai for all θ ∈ (θ∗ − δ, θ∗ + δ). Let
pi′ = inf
θ∈Θ
pi′ (θ) .
By Assumption A3, pi′(θ) is positive everywhere, and since it is continuous, the com-
pactness of Θ guarantees that pi′ is bounded away from zero.
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Define the function
k (ht, θ) =
1
t
∑
s<t
[
ui
(
θ, ai′, vi
(
θs, a
i′, a−is
))− ui (θ, ai, vi (θs, ai, a−is ))] gi (θs, θ)
=
1
t
∑
s<t
∆
(
θ, θs, a
−i
s
)
gi (θs, θ)
for finite histories ht =
(
θs, a
i
s, a
−i
s
)
s<t
and states θ. Player i will not choose action ai
at state θ following history ht if k (ht, θ) > 0. Thus the second step will be complete if
we show that, for some δ > 0, after any history ht, we have
∣∣k(ht, θ)− k(ht, θ′)∣∣ < pi′
whenever |θ − θ′| < δ.
By Assumption A4, ∆
(
θ, θs, a
−i
s
)
gi (θs, θ) is uniformly continuous in θ over all θs
and a−is . Hence the average k(ht, θ) is also continuous in θ uniformly over all values of
θ and all histories ht, as needed.
Finally, partition the set Θ into a finite number of subsets Θ1, . . . ,Θm, each of
diameter less than δ (where δ is chosen given pi′ as in the second step above). Consider
any of these subsets Θl. If Θl contains some θ∗ at which ai is pi-dominated by ai′
(under some profile), then by the first step, k(ht, θ∗) is eventually larger than pi′. By
the second step, k(ht, θ) is therefore positive for all types in Θl. Hence there almost
surely exists some period Tl after which Player i never plays action ai at any state in
Θl. Since there are only finitely many sets Θl, there almost surely exists some T after
which Player i never plays action ai at any state θ for which it is serially pi-dominated
for the corresponding type in the modified game. The result now follows from the
finiteness of the action and player sets.
Part (2). First we claim that for any k, the probability that play is consistent with
k rounds of IEDS in the modified game approaches one as time tends to infinity. In
the proof of Lemma 4.1, we showed that for any δ > 0, there exists some pi > 0 such
that the set of types θ at which k rounds of IEDS differ from k rounds of IEpiDS has
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measure at most δ. Thus the probability that θt lies in this set can be made arbitrarily
small by choosing pi to be sufficiently small. Note that outside of this set, play under
the learning process is almost surely eventually consistent with k rounds of IEDS by
Statement 1 of the theorem. This proves the claim.
For each k = 1, 2, . . ., denote by Θik the set of types of Player i for which all
serially dominated actions are eliminated within the first k rounds of IEDS. Let Θk =⋂
i=1,...,I Θ
i
k. The sequence of sets Θk is nondecreasing in k, and converges to the set
Θ. Hence the measure of the set Θ \Θk converges to zero as k tends to infinity. From
the previous paragraph, the probability that play is consistent with IEDS on Θk tends
to one over time, and the probability that the state θt lies in Θ \ Θk can be made
arbitrarily small by choosing k to be sufficiently large.
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